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Justice Ginsburg's Footnotes
Jay D. Wexler*

I don't think I will be giving away any state secrets if I reveal that one of the most
memorable tasks I performed during my clerkship with Justice Ginsburg in the 1998-1999
term of the Supreme Court involved working on an opera-based footnote skirmish that
broke out between her and Justice Scalia during the penning of an opinion in the Fourth
Amendment case of Minnesota v. Carter.1 That case raised the question of whether the Fourth
Amendment protects people who are social guests in someone else's house from
unreasonable searches there. Defendants Carter and Johns had been in Thompson's house
for a total of 2 ½ hours when a police officer, acting on a tip from an informant, peered
through a gap in some closed window blinds and observed Carter and Johns bagging
cocaine. Searches of the defendants' car and the apartment turned up forty-seven grams of
coke. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the officer had violated Carter and Johns'
Fourth Amendment rights by peering through Thompson's window without a warrant, and
it reversed their convictions.2
The U.S. Supreme Court took the case and reinstated the convictions.3 In an
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the two defendants did not
have legitimate expectations of privacy in Thompson's house, distinguishing the facts from
those in Minnesota v. Olson, in which the Court had held that overnight guests in someone

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I would like to thank Mark Dahl for tremendous
research assistance that was essential to the preparation of this article.
1 525 U.S. 98 (1998).
2 Id. at 471-72.
3 Id. at 472.
*
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else's house do have such expectations.4 Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence,5 and Justice
Ginsburg wrote a dissent.6 It's been ten years,7 so I'm not sure I can recreate the sequence
of events entirely, but the footnote skirmish broke out sort of like this. First, Justice
Ginsburg circulated a dissent in which she claimed that United States v. Katz,8 which had held
that the government violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by surreptitiously
recording his conversations on a public telephone and which stated that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,"9 was "key to [her] view of the case."10 Justice
Scalia then drafted a concurrence in which he argued that the text of the amendment pretty
much protects people only when they are in their own houses; in the midst of this, he
criticized Justice Ginsburg's reliance on the Katz test, which Justice Scalia noted "has come
to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan's separate concurrence."11
It was at this point, I believe, when the action moved to the footnotes. Justice
Ginsburg drafted a note addressing what she called "Justice Scalia's lively concurring
opinion."12 She argued that "[i]n suggesting that we have elevated Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Katz to first place . . . Justice Scalia undervalues the clear opinion of
the Court that 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.' . . . That core
understanding is the leitmotif of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion. One cannot avoid a
strong sense of déjà vu on reading Justice Scalia's elaboration. It so vividly recalls the opinion
of Justice Black in dissent in Black."13 This reference to leitmotifs was impossible for Justice

Id. at 471-74.
Id. at 474-78.
6 Id. at 481-84.
7 Dear lord, I feel old.
8 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9 Id. at 351.
10 Carter, 525 U.S. at 483.
11 Id. at 477.
12 Id. at 483 n.2.
13 Id.
4
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Scalia to ignore. Both Scalia and Ginsburg are opera fans—Scalia, for instance, always goes
with clerks to a pizza place in the District where opera is played on the jukebox—and they
are also good friends, so it is not surprising that Scalia picked up on the reference to take
some light-hearted stabs at the dissent. In his own footnote responding to Justice
Ginsburg's footnote, Justice Scalia wrote:
That the Fourth Amendment does not protect places is simply unresponsive
to the question whether the Fourth Amendment protects people in other
people's homes. In saying this, I do not, as the dissent claims, clash with "the
leitmotif" of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion" in Katz . . . ; au contraire (or,
to be more Wagnerian, im Gegenteil), in this regard I am entirely in harmony
with that opinion, and it is the dissent that sings from another opera.14
I think I was in the study of my tiny, rat-infested apartment two blocks from the
Court when Justice Ginsburg first told me about Justice Scalia's footnote while we were on
the phone talking about some last minute details in the opinion. If I remember right, she
seemed to be quite amused by the opera references, and while I might just be totally making
this up, I think there was at least a little talk about perhaps firing back a couple of operabased retorts in Scalia's direction. Whether or not this possibility was ever in fact raised
outside of my own head, no further opera references were ever made, and the footnote
skirmish came to an end as quickly as it had started.

At first glance (and, admittedly, at second and maybe even third glances), footnotes
may seem like dull things to discuss, but think about them just a little harder and perhaps
you'll come to agree with me that they are actually pretty interesting. To an expert, for
example, even the most straightforward kind of footnote—one that simply cites one or more
sources to support a proposition in the text—can turn out to be remarkable for what it cites,
or more intriguingly, what it fails to cite. But when the footnotes go beyond mere citation to
14

Id. at 477 n.3.
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extend an argument or respond to an argument or to engage in some attenuated speculation
about a related point or make a joke, they can become downright entertaining, even
fascinating. Footnotes allow the writer to break away from the main text, to use a different
tone, to consider tangents—basically to carry on two conversations with the reader at once,
or at least one-and-a-half. No wonder that writers throughout the ages have used footnotes
to great effect. The eighteenth century historian Edward Gibbon, for instance, used notes
extensively in his classic History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, about which
footnote historian (yes, there exists at least one) Anthony Grafton has written: "[N]othing in
that work did more than its footnotes to amuse his friends or enrage his enemies."15 And
the late, great David Foster Wallace used notes in his fiction to—as he explained in a
priceless television interview with Charlie Rose—break out of the linearity of the text and
mirror the fractured nature of reality in his work.16
At the time I was starting to think about what I might write and talk about at this
symposium, I was thinking about footnotes quite a bit as they related to my own work. I
had written a book in which I used footnotes extensively, mostly for comic effect and in
large part to pay homage to Wallace, but my editors were very wary of them and kept urging
me to cut them out or at least cut them down, claiming over and over that they would look
"lame sitting there at the bottom of the page." I was forced to articulate why I wanted to
keep the footnotes in, which may have convinced the editors to let me keep a few of them,
although in the end I would say probably 2/3 ended up getting cut.
All this thinking about footnotes led me to decide to write a short piece on Justice
Ginsburg's footnotes, which is what this piece is. I was curious about how often she used

ANTHONY GRAFTON, THE FOOTNOTE: A CURIOUS HISTORY 1 (1997).
Interview of David Foster Wallace by Charlie Rose, http://www.charlierose.com/view/clip/9540 (last
viewed January 9, 2009) (discussing the endnotes in Infinite Jest).

15
16
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them and why. I also thought that perhaps I could spark a new field of study in the legal
academy. Goodness knows there are enough footnotes in the legal documents out there to
keep researchers busy for decades. This may seem a bit far-fetched, and of course it is, but
at least some study of footnotes is, I think, worthwhile. As the aforementioned footnote
historian has argued, although "the production of footnotes sometimes resembles less the
skilled work of a professional carrying out a precise function to a higher end than the
offhand production and disposal of waste products," nonetheless, "[h]istorians . . . cannot
afford to ignore waste products and their disposal. The exploration of toilets and sewers has
proved endlessly rewarding to historians of population, city planning, and smells."
So, anyway, there's that.

My original plan when preparing to write this paper had been to read, study, and
analyze every single footnote ever written by Justice Ginsburg as a Supreme Court Justice. I
had this idea that I would come up with a complicated functional taxonomy of Supreme
Court footnote usage and categorize Justice Ginsburg's footnotes according to this
taxonomy and report my findings here, complete with charts and tables and data regression
analysis and fancy multi-colored pie-shaped-diagrams. I asked my research assistant to
prepare a chart with every footnote from every case, along with the case citation and year
and the sentence from the opinion that went along with the footnote, along with a brief
notation of what he thought the footnote's purpose was in the opinion. This was last
summer. Throughout the fall I looked forward eagerly to tackling this ambitious project
sometime after the leaves fell from the trees.
Well, it turns out that what I ended up doing was somewhat more modest than I had
planned. The biggest problem with fulfilling my original vision was that the chart that my
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terrific research assistant Mark put together ended up being something like two million pages
long. Justice Ginsburg, it turns out, has written a lot of footnotes. I don't know exactly how
many, but extrapolating from the number of notes that I did end up looking at, it's probably
somewhere in the area of 1,500. I quickly decided to limit the study. Instead of reading and
analyzing all of Justice Ginsburg's footnotes, I decided instead to look only at the notes she
wrote during three terms of her tenure at the Court: one of her first, her last, and one
somewhere in the middle. I figured this would give me a good enough idea of the different
ways that Justice Ginsburg has utilized footnotes over the course of her career. I would also
be able to see roughly if her use of footnotes—how many, how she uses them—has changed
over time.
Of course, limiting my study in this way necessarily reduces somewhat the accuracy
and value of my conclusions. I don't think, however, that this matters much given the
context. For some studies—say those that have the potential to affect public policy in
profound ways and could prove to be extremely controversial, like the ones purporting to
link abortion and crime rates or greenhouse gas emissions to melting ice caps—an attention
to detail and painstaking accuracy are essential. For a study like this one, however, I figure I
can probably get by with something short of these things. This is also one of the reasons
(the other one being that I don't really know how to use Excel) that I decided to forego the
fancy charts and regression analysis (though if you read far enough, you will indeed find one
table).

Coming up with even a fairly simple taxonomy of Supreme Court footnotage still
required some work. To prepare my study, I read all of the footnotes that Justice Ginsburg
penned during the following terms: 1994-1995 (her second term on the bench); 2007-2008
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(her most recent completed term); and 2000-2001 (roughly in the middle). She wrote ninetyfive footnotes in the 2007-2008 term; about the same number in the 1994-1995 term; and
only about sixty during the 2000-2001 term. I read through the footnotes and played around
with different ways to categorize them. I created provisional taxonomies and then dispensed
with them as they turned out to be inadequate. In the end, I settled on a nine-category
system that seemed to work pretty well. I developed it while reading through the first term I
was considering, and it turned out to then work perfectly well for the other two years, which
gives me some confidence that it is a fairly adequate way of categorizing the notes.
I doubt that the categories I have come up with will be surprising to anyone familiar
with reading judicial opinions. Though it's not impossible for someone so inclined to find a
funny bit or two here and there,17 Justice Ginsburg does not generally use her footnotes in a
Christopher Buckley-Chuck Klosterman18 "ha ha" manner. Furthermore, very few, if any, of
her notes echo Wallace's attempt to break out of the linearity of the text and mirror the
fractured nature of reality through her judicial opinions.19 Instead, the nine different types of
footnotes I was able to identify in Justice Ginsburg's work are those that (1) cite authority or
quote directly from a source; (2) provide further detail about the case history of the case under
review; (3) describe the position of lower courts on some issue; (4) explain why the Court is
taking some action; (5) indicate that the Court will not take a position on or will not decide some
question or issue; (6) mention or explain a point of law established by the Court; (7) provide
additional background information about the case; (8) respond to an argument advanced by a party
17 There's one footnote where the Justice brings up Dickens' Bleak House to make a point; this one made me
smile. See Hess v. Port Authority, 513 U.S. 30, 49 n. 19 ("The dissent questions whether the driving concern of
the Eleventh Amendment is the protection of state treasuries, emphasizing that the Amendment covers 'any
suit in law or equity.' Post, at 410. The suggestion that suits in equity do not drain money as frightfully as
actions at law, however, is belied by the paradigm case. See Jarndyce and Jarndyce (Charles Dickens, Bleak
House (1852))."
18 See generally CHRISTOPHER BUCKLEY, LITTLE GREEN MEN (1997); CHUCK KLOSTERMAN, FARGO ROCK CITY
(2000).
19 See text accompanying note __, supra.
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in the case; and (9) reply to a point made by another Justice in some other opinion in the case.
In what follows, I say a little more about each of these categories and offer an example or
two for each.

Some of the categories are fairly obvious. The first category, for instance, includes
those notes where the Justice simply cites a source for the proposition in the text or quotes
something directly that she has referred to in the text.20 The second category of notes—
those that provide case history—include those that explain what the parties or lower courts or
agencies did in the particular litigation giving rise to the case at the Supreme Court. I also
included in this second category notes regarding the positions taken by the parties in front of
the Court itself, though arguably these could have been peeled off into a separate category.
Thus, for example, I included here a note from the Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw
Nation21—a 1995 case in which an Indian tribe challenged the state's taxation of income
earned on tribal lands by tribal members living off of those lands—where Justice Ginsburg
wrote: "The Tribe's claim, as presented in this case, is a narrow one. The Tribe does not
assert here its authority to tax the income of these tribal members."22 Other examples within
this category are more straightforward—notes about the arguments raised by the parties in
the lower courts,23 the sentences handed out by trial judges,24 or where to find the report of
the Special Master in a case involving the Court's original jurisdiction,25 for instance. A third,
and somewhat related category, include those notes where the Justice characterizes the
positions taken on an issue by the courts of appeals. These fairly uncommon notes are usually
See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 431 n.7 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)); Hess, 513
U.S., at 44 n. 15 (citing New Jersey and New York statutes).
21 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
22 Id. at 464, n. 13.
23 New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 489 n. 1 (2001).
24 Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 46 n. 2 (2001).
25 New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S.Ct. 1410, 1413 n. 4 (2008).
20
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found in majority opinions where Justice Ginsburg is explaining that the Court took the case
to resolve a split in the lower courts.26
Two of the categories concern actions the Court has decided to take in the particular
case under review. Category number four, then, includes footnotes where Justice Ginsburg
self-referentially explains why the Court is taking some action or using some language the way
it is. So, for example, in a case from the 2007-2008 term, the Justice describes why using the
term "privity" in a particular context would be confusing, and then explains that "[t]o ward
off confusion, we avoid using the term 'privity' in this opinion."27 Elsewhere, the Justice
uses a footnote to explain why a particular lawyer was arguing the case—pointing out that
the Court had appointed a lawyer to argue the case for a pro se defendant who had filed a
motion for appointment of counsel.28 I should probably note that by using the term
"explains" to describe this category of footnotes, I am not including those notes in which the
Justice further explains the basis or rationale of the opinion itself but instead just trying to
capture the notes in which she explains why something surprising is happening, generally
something procedural or linguistic. Category five, for its part, might be described as a subset
of category four, though important enough in its own right to justify a separate category—
namely, those notes where the Justice explains that the Court will not take a position on some
issue for whatever reason. Thus in one case, Justice Ginsburg explains that the Court will
not reach an issue urged upon it by one of the parties,29 while elsewhere she mentions that,

See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 2163 n. 3 (2008) ("We granted certiorari . . . to resolve the
disagreement among the Circuits over the permissibility and scope of preclusion based on 'virtual
representation'").
27 Id. at 2165 n. 8.
28 Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 43 n. 3 (1995).
29 Tasani, 533 U.S. at 498 n.8.
26
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like the lower courts in the case, the Supreme Court will also not decide whether a city's
zoning law violates the anti-discrimination provisions of the Federal Housing Authority.30
Two of the most important and prevalent categories—category #6: point of law; and
category #7: background—can be easily confused and therefore justify being treated together.
I define as a "point of law" footnote one in which the Justice explains the law of the
Supreme Court on a point related to the case at hand; a "background" footnote, on the other
hand, refers to a note that provides additional information about the factual context of the
case or the legal context, to the extent that the legal context is set by a source of law other
than the Supreme Court itself (like a state court or state statute or federal regulation). So, for
example, I count as "point of law" footnotes those that indicate "[a]n appellee or respondent
may defend the judgment below on a ground not earlier aired [citing Supreme Court
authority]";31 explain why a previous Supreme Court decision had severed part of a statute
that was relevant to the opinion at hand;32 and quote John Marshall to elucidate the original
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.33 I count as "background" footnotes, however, those
that explain a federal rule of appellate procedure;34 illustrate which baseball teams might owe
what amounts of social security tax using hypothetical figures;35 or discuss the reasons
behind why Congress might have passed some law.36 These categories importantly say
nothing about the function of any of these footnotes—why the Justice might have used
them—but are instead drawn simply on the content of the notes. A more sophisticated
functional account of the Justices' footnotes will have to wait for further study.

City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 730 n. 3 (1995).
Greenlaw v. U.S., 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2567 n. 5 (2008).
32 Kimbrough v. US., 128 SCT 558, 570 n. 12 (2007).
33 Hess, 513 U.S., at 39 n. 9.
34 Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 762 n. 2 (2001).
35 US v. Cleveland Indians Baseball, 532 U.S. 200, 206 n. 9 (2001).
36 Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 47 n. 4 (1995).
30
31
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The final two categories of footnotes, then, are ones in which the Justice reacts to
somebody else. The less prevalent of the two categories is #8, where Justice Ginsburg
explicitly responds to an argument raised by one of the parties, as she did in the Court's most
recently completed term—for example, in New Jersey v. Delaware, where she "f[ou]nd
unconvincing New Jersey's contention that its officials were ignorant of the State's own
statutes,"37 and in Preston v. Ferrer, where she refused to "take up Ferrer's invitation to
overrule" a case contrary to his position.38 More prevalent and interesting is category #9,
where the Justice—like in the opera-based footnote skirmish that I began with—responds to
the argument of another Justice. Over the three terms studied, Justice Ginsburg replied to
another Justice almost twice as often as she responded to a party. Though she certainly
never shies away from answering the arguments of other Justices, Justice Ginsburg's replies
are always civil and respectful; one finds in her opinions no invectives or linguistic versions
of jumping up and down or stomping her feet as we occasionally see from some other
members of the Court. On the contrary, Justice Ginsburg might suggest only that the
dissent's argument is "hardly an answer"39 to some point, or that the dissent has employed
"curious reasoning,"40 or raised something "not relevant."41
These, then, are the nine categories of Justice Ginsburg's footnotes. The following
chart summarizes the number of times she used each type of footnote per term that I
studied, as well as the percentage of all notes in any given term that fell into each category.
I'm not sure if anything in the chart can be said to be particularly fascinating. I do think it's
somewhat interesting that in each term, footnotes used to provide background information

New Jersey, 128 S.Ct., at 1426 n. 20.
Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 983 n. 2 (2008).
39 Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S., at 431 n.6
40 City of Edmonds, 514 U.S., at 737 n. 11.
41 U.S. v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 n. 2 (1995).
37
38
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were by far the most prevalent. In two of the three terms, case history footnotes made up
the second largest group of notes, while citations and quotations were also fairly numerous
in two of the three terms. As to trends over time, perhaps the most interesting result of the
study relates to the relative prevalence of the Justice's responses to the other Justices as
opposed to the parties. With respect to percentages, category #9 (Reply to Justice) rose each
term, from 10% in 1994-1995 to 11% in 2000-2001 to 15% in 2007-2008, while category #8
(Respond to Party) fell from 7% in 1994-1995 to 4% in 2007-2008 (though with a result of
11% in between). Perhaps this reflects a greater comfort level over time with responding to
other members of the bench and a feeling of lesser need to respond to arguments made by
the parties themselves, although the result could also certainly be explained by factors having
nothing at all to do with this rationale (I told you the results wouldn't be precise).
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Justice Ginsburg's Footnotes by Type and Year

Type of Footnote

1994-1995

2000-2001

2007-2008

Cite/Quote

15 (16%)

12 (20%)

6 (6%)

Case History

18 (19%)

8 (13%)

18 (18%)

Lower Courts

4 (4%)

0 (0%)

3 (3%)

Explain

2 (2%)

1 (2%)

5 (5%)

No Position

2 (2%)

7 (11%)

5 (5%)

Point of Law

14 (15%)

3 (5%)

16 (16%)

Background

24 (25%)

16 (26%)

27 (27%)

Respond to Party

7 (7%)

7 (11%)

4 (4%)

Reply to Justice

10 (10%)

7 (11%)

15 (15%)

TOTAL

96

61

99

The final thing I did in connection with this first-ever I-think-study-of-JusticeGinsburg's-footnotes is to review the notes she wrote in the cases during the 1998-1999
term that I happened to work on. There were twenty-two of them, and apart perhaps from
the footnote that cited the fifteenth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica for the
proposition that "the photocopy machine was not yet on the scene" in 1949, they were all
pretty standard stuff.42 About a third of the notes provided background information;

Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 353 n. 5 (1999). The question in the case
was when the thirty-day period for removal of a case from state to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
begins running; is it the day that the defendant is served, or might it begin running earlier, upon receipt of a
faxed "courtesy copy" of the complaint? Fascinating stuff, this. In pointing out that the 1949 Congress that
passed the relevant statutory amendment could not have had the situation posed by the case in mind, Justice
42
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another third or so related case history. There were four citation/quotation notes, a couple
of responses to the parties (one actually to an amicus, which perhaps suggests broadening
category #8 slightly), and two replies to other Justices. I suppose that I was in a unique
position that year to somehow convince the Justice to throw in a footnote that would have
highlighted the fractured nature of reality, but probably such a suggestion would have simply
earned me a pink slip. That's OK, though, because I still have the memory of the opera
footnote skirmish. I assure you: It is not one I will soon forget.

Ginsburg observed in the footnote that there were no fax machines in 1949. The point about the photocopy
machine appears to be simply an additional piece of background information to provide further context
regarding the history of print-related technology.
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